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Abstract
We study the mean field dynamics of a model introduced by Phan et al [Wehia, 2005] of a
polymorphic social community. The individuals may choose between three strategies: either not
to join the community or, in the case of joining it, to cooperate or to behave as a free-rider. Indi-
viduals’ preferences have an idiosyncratic component and a social component. Cooperators bear
a fixed cost whereas free-riders support a cost proportional to the number of cooperators. We
study the dynamics of this model analytically in the mean field approximation for both parallel
and sequential updating. As we vary one of the parameters while keeping the other parameters
fixed, the phase diagram experiences a rich class of bifurcations. Noticeably, a limit cycle is
shown to exist in both parallel and sequential updating, under certain parameter settings. A
comparison of the analytical predictions with computer simulations is also included.
Keywords: Social Networks Interactions, Dynamical Systems, Bifurcation.
1 Introduction
Recently [1, 2] a model was proposed to analyze social organizations whose members are
expected to cooperate to a public good. Basic evidence on several kinds of communities,
as well as data obtained in public goods experiments [3, 4], reveal a rough partition
between individuals that cooperate to the public good and pure consumers (also called
free-riders). This polymorphic configuration seems to be a stable form of organization.
The model corresponds to the following situation: individuals have to decide
whether to join an organization or community. The members of the organization have
to contribute to a task whose realization is beneficial for everybody. Cooperators bear
a fixed cost for producing the public good for the community. The surplus of all the
individuals, cooperators or not, increases proportionally to the number of cooperators.
Individuals that do not cooperate are punished by cooperators through costless moral
disapproval, which may be either a subjective moral burden, or a true sanction. This
cost, proportional to the fraction of cooperators, is idiosyncratically weighted.
In the present paper, we consider the dynamical evolution of the model analyti-
cally, within a mean field approximation. Parallel and sequential updating are studied
through the evolution of the corresponding map and flow respectively. They present
different behaviors, depending on the models parameters.
The most striking result of our analysis is that for some range of parameter values
and initial conditions, the trajectories of the flow reach the fixed points determined
by Phan et al. [1] through quasi-cyclic paths that may last for very long times. The
corresponding map exhibits a limit cycle. Thus, under such conditions, macroscopic
fractions of individuals change their strategies successively. In experimental economics
settings that correspond to parallel updating, true cycles might appear. In sequential
updating, the transient oscillatory behavior of the system may be very long lasting,
and should thus be observable in actual systems.
The paper is organized as follows: next section presents the details of the model
and its equilibrium fixed points. Section 3 is devoted to the study of a mean field
approximation of the dynamical equations. These describe the evolution of the fraction
of cooperators and of free-riders. We consider both parallel and sequential updating,
and study the corresponding map and flow. We show that the system may exhibit
strong oscillations of the fraction of cooperators and of free-riders, and that limit
cycles may exist for some range of the parameters. Numerical simulations presented in
section 4 show that the predicted behaviours exist in finite size systems and might be
observable in actual systems. The paper ends with a discussion and some conclusions.
2 The model
The basic economic model analyzed in this paper was introduced by Phan et al. [1]. It
considers a system of N agents that must choose one among the following strategies:
Si = 1 (to join the community and cooperate)
Si = 2 (to join the community and free-ride)
Si = 3 (not to join the community)
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Each individual i has a private idiosyncratic willingness to join the community, hi.
Its mean value over the population is h and we write: hi ≡ h + yi where yi is a
quenched random variable with zero mean. Individuals that join the community have
a social benefit proportional to the fraction of the population that join the community,
weighted by a coefficient j, and an additional payoff proportional to the fraction of
cooperators, weighted by a constant g. Then, depending on whether they cooperate
or not, they bear different costs. A cooperator bears a fixed cost c. Free-riders do not
bear this cost, but instead support a moral punishment proportional to the fraction
of cooperators. This punishment is weighted by an idiosyncratic positive constant xi.
All the parameters of the model (h, j, g, c as well as the values of {yi} and {xi} for
1 ≤ i ≤ N) are measured in units of the variance of the random variable yi.
The fraction of cooperators is:
ηc ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
δSi,1,
where δ denotes the Kroenecker delta. That of free-riders is:
ηf ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
δSi,2,
so that the fraction of individuals that join the community is ηa = ηc + ηf ≤ 1.
Each agent chooses the strategy that maximizes his surplus function,
Vi (Si) = (Ai +Bi) δSi,1 + Ai δSi,2. (1)
Ai is the surplus of joining the community being free-rider, and Bi is the bonus of
cooperating:
Ai = h+ yi + j(ηc + ηf ) + (g − xi)ηc, (2a)
Bi = xiηc − c. (2b)
From equation(1), the best response of agent i to the neighborhood’s behavior can be
rewritten as follows:
Si = 1, ⇐⇒ Ai +Bi > 0 and Bi > 0; (3a)
Si = 2, ⇐⇒ Ai > 0 and Bi < 0; (3b)
Si = 3, otherwise (3c)
2.1 The Cluster Structure
In order to get some insight about the problem, it is useful to consider a plane whose
axes are the quenched random variables x (abscissas) and y (ordinates), as in figure
1. Each individual i is represented by a point according to his values (xi, yi). The
lines represent the marginal individuals whose utilities are at the boundaries between
different optimal strategies. These are:
y = ym ≡ −h− j(ηc + ηf )− gηc + c, (4)
y = ym − c+ xηc, (5)
x = xm ≡
c
ηc
. (6)
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Then, according to (3), individuals in region I will choose to cooperate, in region II to
free-ride and in region III not to join the community.
✲
x
✻y
O
Ai +Bi = 0 ; y = ym
Bi = 0 ; x = xm
✟
✟
✟
✟ Ai = 0 ; y = ym − c+ xηm
III
III
Figure 1: Boundaries between regions corresponding to the different individual choices,
as a function of the values of the quenched random variables.
2.2 Fraction of cooperators and free-riders at equilibrium
The fixed points of the system for different distributions of the quenched random
variables {xi, yi} have been discussed in [1] and [2] in the mean field approximation
N →∞. We summarize them here for completeness.
Introducing the complementary cumulative functions:
Gχ(ζ) ≡ 1− Fχ(ζ) =
∫
∞
ζ
fχ(ξ)dξ (7)
where χ ∈ {X,Y }, and Fχ(ζ) is the cumulative distribution of fχ, ηc and ηf have the
following expressions in terms of the G functions and the marginal values (4):
ηc = GX(xm) GY (ym), (8a)
ηf =
∫ xm
0
fX(x) GY (ym − c+ xηc) dx, . (8b)
The solutions to equations (8) give the fraction of cooperators and free-riders at equi-
librium as a function of the parameters of the problem, namely h, j, g, c, d (these pa-
rameters are measured in units of the variance of the distribution of y). Notice that
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ηc = 0 is always solution of (8a), in which case all the members are free-riders, and the
problem reduces to that of the simple social interactions model considered in [5, 6] and
references therein. It is important to stress that, due to the non symmetric interaction
xi, there is no reason that the stationary states of the system be exclusively fixed
points, as is the case for symmetric interactions1.
In this paper we consider the most interesting of the cases analyzed in [1], with the
xi following a uniform distribution of finite width d:
fX(x) =
1
d
for 0 ≤ x ≤ d, (9a)
fX(x) = 0 otherwise. (9b)
and the yi distributed according to the following probability density function:
fY (y) =
1
4 cosh2(y/2)
. (10)
The cumulative function corresponding to (10) is the logistic distribution, and its
complementary function is:
GY (z) = 1/[1 + exp(z)]. (11)
In this case, following Phan et al. [1], equations (8) may be written as follows:
ηc = (1−
ρ
ηc
) GY (c− Z) (12a)
ηf =
ρ
cηc
log[1 + (ec − 1)GY (c− Z)], (12b)
where ρ ≡ c/d and Z ≡ h+ j(ηc + ηf ) + gηc.
Calling G the value taken by GY (c − Z), one has ηc = (1 −
ρ
ηc
) G, which gives ηc
(if > 0) in terms of G:
ηc = η
±
c [G] ≡
1
2
G {1± [1−
4ρ
G
]1/2} (13)
Later we’ll see that both the + and the − branches may give stable equilibria, though
the parameter range for which a stable equilibrium exists for the − branch is much
narrower than for the + branch. The function η+c [G] is very close to its asymptote,
G−ρ, for all the values of G. From (13) one gets that if ηc 6= 0, then ηc ≥ 2ρ. Equality
can occur when j = g = 0.
Equation (12b) can also be parameterized in terms of G by defining
η ≡
j(ηc + ηf ) + gηc
j + g
. (14)
Introducing (13) and (12b) into (14) we obtain an equation for η:
η = η1[G] ≡ η
±
c [G] +
j
j + g
1
η±c [G]
1
d
log[1 + (ec − 1)G] (15)
1In Ising systems, with binary microscopic states and symmetric interactions, the only attractors
are fixed points for sequential dynamics, and either fixed points or cycles of order two for parallel
dynamics.
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Inverting (11) for z = c− h− (j + g)η, we obtain η in terms of G:
η = η2[G] ≡
1
j + g
{c− h− log
1−G
G
}. (16)
The possible solutions η are then obtained by the intersects of the curves η1[G] and
η2[G]. Introducing the corresponding value of G into (13) allows to determine ηc, and
then ηf is deduced by introducing the values of ηc and η into (14). An example of
curves η1[G] and η2[G] (G ∈ [0, 1]) is shown on Figure (2), which presents up to 3
intersects (for h − c = −3.3), although one can check that at most 2 correspond to
stable equilibria. Notice that this analysis allows to determine the fixed points of the
system, but doesn’t give any hint about the existence of cycles.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
G
η[G
]
j = 5
g = 1
c = 4.5
d = 72
h − c = −3.7
h − c = −3.3
h − c = −3.1
Figure 2: Solution by curve intersection - a case of interest.
3 Mean field dynamics
We are interested in the temporal evolution of the system within a repeated game
setting, in which individuals have to choose their best strategies Si(t) based on the
available information. We assume that each time an agent has to make a decision, he
has the exact information of the global proportions of cooperators and free-riders at
the preceding outcome, ηc(t−1) and ηf (t−1), and uses these quantities to estimate his
utility (2). Such a dynamics is called Cournot best reply in economics literature. In
simulations, starting from initial guesses ηc(0) and ηf (0), the updating is said to be in
parallel if all the individuals in the population first determine their best strategies based
on the preceding outcome, and make their decisions simultaneously afterwards. At the
opposite, in random sequential updating, a single individual is selected at random and
asked to make his decision at each time step. The latter dynamics simulates systems
where the individuals make their decisions without any time coherence. In order to
compare the time scales of both dynamics, it is usual to consider that N sequential
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time steps are equivalent to one parallel update. Intermediate updating schemes may
be implemented, but we only consider these two extreme cases in this paper.
Referring back to Figure 1, since the boundary lines depend on the values of ηc(t)
and ηf (t), they will shift in the course of updating according to the perceived pro-
portions of cooperators and free-riders. Individuals whose values of yi and xi lie close
to the boundaries are susceptible to small changes of ηc and ηf : their strategies may
change with time, and in turn induce changes in those of the others.
We are interested in the way the system reaches its stable states upon successive
updates, that is, the path followed by a point representative of the system’s state in
the plane (ηc, ηf ). Such paths should either end up in one of the stable fixed points
determined by the previous analysis, or get trapped in other types of attractors if they
exist. In the following we consider separately the two updating schemes, since the
corresponding dynamic equations are different.
3.1 Parallel dynamics: two-dimensional map
In parallel dynamics, one assumes that the agents are updated simultaneously start-
ing from an arbitrary initial configuration, i.e. the perceived ηc and ηf used by all
the agents to estimate their utilities are the same. The boundary lines between the
three regions of figure 1, which depend on ηc(t) and ηf (t), partition the population
at time t according to their estimated utilities: all the individuals whose idiosyncratic
parameters lie in region I will choose to cooperate, those in region II to free-ride
and those in region III not to join. In this way, using equations (8), the dynamics
can be formulated as the following two-dimensional deterministic map in the simplex
S := {(ηc, ηf ) : ηc ≥ 0, ηf ≥ 0, ηc + ηf ≤ 1}:
Ω : (η′c, η
′
f ) = (p(ηc, ηf ), q(ηc, ηf )) (17a)
≡ (
∫
∞
xm
fX(x)dx
∫
∞
ym
fY (y)dy,
∫ xm
−∞
∫
∞
ym−c+xηc
fX(x)fY (y)dydx). (17b)
In the case considered in this paper, the density functions are (9) and (10). Since fX
has a bounded support, the first equation vanishes if 0 < ηc(t) < ρ. Thus, if the initial
value of ηc is such that ηc(0) < ρ, then ηc(1) = 0 and a state with no cooperator
is reached after a single parallel update. Afterwards, on the axis ηc = 0, ηf evolves
according to
ηf (t+ 1) =
∫
∞
−h−jηf (t)
fY (y)dy. (18)
The equilibrium value of ηf is obtained replacing ηf (t) by ηf in the above equation.
It has been shown [7] that there is a critical value of j, jB , such that for j < jB , there
is a single equilibrium. In that case all the points ηc(0) < ρ will eventually be mapped
to it. If j > jB equation (18) with ηf (t) = ηf has three solutions. One of them, ηfu is
an unstable fixed point separating the basin of attraction of the two others, that are
stable. To summarize, when ηc(0) < ρ, after a first time step the system is mapped to
the axis ηc = 0 and then evolves, following (18), either to one fixed point (if j < jB) or
to one of two fixed points (if j > jB) depending on whether ηf (0) > ηfu or ηf (0) < ηfu.
In the case of the logistic distribution considered here, jB = 4.
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When ηc(0) > ρ, the dynamics is most fruitfully studied numerically. In two-
dimensional maps or flows, a fixed point is called a sink if all the points in its neigh-
borhood converge to it, a source if these points diverge from it and a saddle if in one
direction the map or flow converges, while in the other directions it diverges. Together
these three types are called hyperbolic, which is the only kind of equilibria possibly
encountered in a structurally stable system, i.e. a system stable with respect to small
variations of the parameters (in our case h, j, g, c and d). For our two-dimensional
map, the nature of an equilibrium point (ηc0, ηf0) is determined by the following Ja-
cobian matrix
Jm =
[
∂p(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηc ∂p(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηf
∂q(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηc ∂q(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηf
]
.
Denoting the two eigenvalues of Jm as a1 and a2, then the fixed point is a sink if |a1| < 1
and |a2| < 1, a source if |a1| > 1 and |a2| > 1 and a saddle if (|a1| − 1)(|a2| − 1) < 0
([8]§1.4). There are two types of curves emanating from each saddle point x0, namely
the stable manifold, defined as
Ws(x0) = {x ∈ R
2|Ωn(x)→ x0 as n→∞} (19)
and the unstable manifold, defined as
Wu(x0) = {x ∈ R
2|Ω−n(x)→ x0 as n→∞} (20)
Ω−1 denoting a backward iterate of the map. The boundaries of the basins of attraction
are usually formed by stable manifolds. Moreover, if a transversal intersection between
the stable and unstable manifolds of the same saddle point exists, the map will exhibit
chaotic behavior.
In view of their crucial importance, we have numerically computed the stable and
unstable manifolds for each saddle point, with the same set of j, g, c and d as in
Figure 2, while changing h − c from −4 to −3 in steps of 0.02. The algorithms used
to compute the stable and unstable manifolds can be found in [9] and Chapter 10
of [10], respectively. The results classified according to the qualitative dynamical
features are shown in Figures (3-8). Hereafter we provide the increasing values of
h − c, denoted by λi, at which the successive bifurcations appear, together with the
qualitative descriptions of their nature.
• λ1 = −4.0971. For h − c < λ1 there exists no intersection between η1(G) and
η2(G) and all the points in S are eventually mapped to the trivial fixed point,
which is always a solution of the equations. At h − c = λ1, η2(G) begins to
intersect η−1 (G) at two points, one of which is a saddle (H−) and the other is
a source (X−) (Figure 3). The process of simultaneous creation or elimination
of a pair of equilibrium points is called a saddle-node bifurcation. Note that
this bifurcation does not alter the overall behavior of the system, since no new
attractor is created. Thus, only the fixed points ηc = 0, ηf > 0 exist, and since
j > jB , the system may flow to either of the two fixed points for ηf depending
on the initial conditions.
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η f
ρ
H
−
X
−
h − c = −3.7
j = 5
g = 1
c = 4.5
d = 72
Figure 3: Map. The stable and unstable manifolds for h− c = −3.7. Throughout this
article, stable manifolds are represented by dashed lines and unstable manifolds by
dotted lines. It’s well understood from their definitions that an arbitrary initial point
on the stable manifold will be mapped towards the saddle from which it emanates,
while one on the unstable manifold will be mapped away from it. Sinks, sources and
saddles are represented by O, X, and H respectively, and the subscripts describe the
branch (η+1 (G)/η
−
1 (G)) on which the equilibrium is found.
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Figure 4: Map. H+ and O+ have been created from a saddle node bifurcation on
η+1 (G).
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Figure 5: Map. A separatrix bifurcation between the stable manifold of H− and
the unstable manifold of H+ has introduced a first order transition in the basin of
attraction.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
η
c
η f
ρ
H
−
X
+
O
+
H
+
C
s
h − c = −3.3
j = 5
g = 1
c = 4.5
d = 72
Figure 6: Map. A separatrix bifurcation between the stable and unstable manifolds of
H+ has introduced a stable cycle Cs with its own basin of attraction.
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Figure 7: Map. The stable limit cycle Cs has merged with the source X+ through a
Hopf bifurcation to become a sink O′+.
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Figure 8: Map. A final saddle node bifurcation has annihilated O′+ and H+.
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• λ2 = −3.4201. Another saddle-node bifurcation happens on η
+
1 (G) at h−c = λ2,
with a saddle (H+) and a sink (O+) created simultaneously (Figure 4). Now the
stable manifolds of H+ and H− possess a common end emanating from X+, and
together they divide S into two regions. Points outside the region bounded by
the stable manifolds should converge to the trivial fixed point ηc = 0, ηf > 0 as
before, and those inside to O+.
• λ3 = −3.3617. For λ2 < h− c < λ3, the unstable manifold of H+ approaches the
stable manifold of H− until they coincide at h − c = λ3 (the common manifold
is called a separatrix between H+ and H−). Beyond this value, the unstable
manifold of H+ folds back and converges to O+ while the stable manifold of
H− hits the simplex boundary ηf = 0 (Figure 5). Now the basin boundary is
determined solely by the stable manifold of H−, causing the basin of attraction
of O+ to experience a sudden expansion.
• λ4 = −3.3504. For λ3 < h − c < λ4, the stable and unstable manifolds of H+
approach each other until they coincide at h − c = λ4. Beyond this value, the
former ends up at the boundary ηf = 0 of S and the latter folds back into a
stable limit cycle Cs around X+ (Figure 6). At this transition Cs is introduced
into the system as a new attractor with its own basin of attraction delimited by
the stable manifold of H+.
• λ5 = −3.2726. For λ4 < h − c < λ5, Cs shrinks and eventually merges with
X+ at h − c = λ5 to produce a sink O
′
+ (Figure 7). The process of transition
between a sink and a source with the simultaneous appearance or disappearance
of a limit cycle is called a Hopf bifurcation.
• λ6 = −3.1146. For λ5 < h − c < λ6, O
′
+ and H+ approach each other until
they are annihilated at h − c = λ6. We are left with H− and O+, the stable
manifold of H− serving as the basin boundary (Figure 8). This topology persists
for arbitrarily larger values of h− c.
Summarizing the analysis above, we can identify three types of transition:
1. saddle-node bifurcation;
2. Hopf bifurcation;
3. separatrix bifurcation between two saddle points, or one saddle point with itself.
Type 1 can be directly determined from the number of intersections between η1(G) and
η2(G) (cf. figure 2), or from the fact that Jm has an eigenvalue +1. Due to the lack of
symmetry in our system, transcritical and pitchfork bifurcations never occur ([8] §3.4).
In case that Jm has an eigenvalue −1, one can have a period-doubling bifurcation ([8]
§3.5). This never happens in our map, since one can easily verify that
Jm(1, 1) > 0, Jm(2, 2) > 0, ∆(Jm) > 0, (21)
which excludes the possibility that Jm has a negative eigenvalue.
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Types 2 and 3 cannot be observed from the intersections between η1(G) and η2(G)
and must be determined numerically. Type 2 remains a local bifurcation with Jm
having a pair of conjugate complex eigenvalues with unit modulus. In contrast, Type
3 is a global bifurcation with the area of the basin of attraction experiencing a sudden
jump or, in physicist’s terms, a first-order transition. Numerically we have found no
evidence for homoclinic intersection leading to chaos, but the question as to whether
chaos exists in our two-dimensional map remains open.
3.2 Sequential dynamics: two-dimensional flow
In sequential dynamics, one updates one agent chosen at random in each time step.
It is usual to consider N (the number of agents in the system) successive random
sequential updates (called one Monte-Carlo step) as being comparable to one step of
parallel updating.
In each individual update, the expected displacement of the pair (ηc, ηf ) is
(∆ηc,∆ηf ) =
1
N
(p(ηc, ηf )− ηc, q(ηc, ηf )− ηf ), (22)
where p and q are defined in (17). Taking the continuous limit N → ∞, we have the
following set of differential equations
dηc/dt = p(ηc, ηf )− ηc, (23a)
dηf/dt = q(ηc, ηf )− ηf , (23b)
with the time unit being one Monte-Carlo step. Now the community evolves as an
autonomous system with planar phase space, or a two-dimensional flow in S.
The three generic types of equilibria, namely source, sink and saddle exist in a
structurally stable two-dimensional flow as well. However, the nature of an equilibrium
point (ηc0, ηf0) is now determined by the Jacobian matrix of the flow
Jf =
[
∂p(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηc − 1 ∂p(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηf
∂q(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηc ∂q(ηc0, ηf0)/∂ηf − 1
]
.
Denoting the eigenvalues of Jf as a1 and a2, then the point is a sink if a1 < 0 and
a2 < 0, a source if a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 and a saddle if a1a2 < 0 ([8] §1.2∼1.3). Note
that the condition for an equilibrium to be a saddle gives the same inequality as in the
parallel case. Therefore, the set of saddle points in sequential updating coincides with
that in parallel updating. However, the set of sinks or sources are not necessarily the
same in both cases, since the governing inequalities are quite different. The definitions
of the stable and unstable manifolds are analog to those in the two-dimensional map
with the discrete time step replaced by the continuous time variable t. However,
we note that the two-dimensional flow system, according to the Poincare´-Bendixson
Theorem ([8] Theorem 1.8.1), will never go into chaos.
We have computed the stable and unstable manifolds as for the map. The results
shown in Figures (9-13). Hereafter we provide the bifurcation values of h− c, denoted
by µi, together with the qualitative descriptions of the nature of the bifurcation:
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Figure 9: Flow. The stable and unstable manifolds for the flow. Compare with Figure
3.
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Figure 10: Flow. A sink O− together with an unstable limit cycle Cu has emerged
from the source X− through a Hopf bifurcation.
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Figure 11: Flow. A separatrix bifurcation has eliminated Cu and expanded the basin
of attraction of the sink.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
η
c
η f
ρ
H
−
O
+
’
O
+
H
+
h − c = −3.3
j = 5
g = 1
c = 4.5
d = 72
Figure 12: Flow. H+ and O+ have been created from a saddle node bifurcation on
η+1 (G). Compare with Figure 6.
15
• µ1 = λ1 = −4.0971. As in the parallel case, a saddle node bifurcation occurs at
h− c = µ1 and produces a saddle H− and a source X− (Figure 9).
• µ2 = −3.6172. A Hopf bifurcation occurs at h−c = µ2 and produces an unstable
limit cycle Cu together with a sink O− from the source X− (Figure 10). The
basin of attraction of O− is the area surrounded by Cu. Note that we’ve been able
to choose h− c such that the sink remains in the negative branch, which implies
that variation of η with respect to h− c does not always qualify to determine the
stability of the fixed point.
• µ3 = −3.4980. A separatrix bifurcation of the stable and unstable manifolds of
H− eliminates Cu (Figure 11).
• µ4 = λ2 = −3.4201. A saddle node bifurcation occurs at h−c = µ4 and produces
a sink O+ and a saddle H
+ (Figure 12).
• µ5 = λ6 = −3.1146. A saddle node bifurcation occurs at h − c = µ5 and
annihilates the saddle H+ and the source O
′
+. The topology persists for larger
h− c (Figure 13).
Thus, we have the same types of bifurcation as in the parallel case, and Peixoto’s
Theorem ([8] Theorem 1.9.1) indicates that these are the only types of bifurcation ex-
pected in a two-dimensional flow system. However, let’s note that the overall topology
of the dynamics depends strongly on their order of occurrence. For example, if the
separatrix bifurcation happens before the Hopf bifurcation, a stable limit cycle can be
created just like in the parallel case (Figure 14).
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Figure 13: Flow. A final saddle node bifurcation has annihilated O′+ andH+. Compare
with Figure 8.
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4 Comparison with Computer Simulations
We simulated systems of N = 1000 agents, corresponding to the parameter values of
figures 15 to 20, with parallel dynamics. Starting from different initial conditions, we
determined the trajectories in the phase space (ηc, ηf ). The results, presented on figures
15 to 20 show an excellent egreement with the analytical results. The complexity of
the map diagram is reflected on the winding trajectories. One of the most striking
results of the simulations is that the fraction of cooperators and free-riders oscillate in
time, even in systems for which do not expect to have cycles.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the time evolution of a social system with cooperators
and free-riders. We analyzed the two-dimensional dynamical system and obtained
different phase diagrams corresponding to various parameter settings. The fact that
a rich class of bifurcations can occur within the narrow tubular region enclosed by
the curves h − c = −3.7 and h − c = −3.1 in Figure (2) is in itself truly remarkable.
Physically this phenomenon has its root in the strong asymmetry inherent in the
interaction between agents, due to the idiosyncratic weights that the free-riders give
to the social disapproval. Moreover, in the context of parallel and sequential updating,
we have sometimes distinctly different phase diagram for the same parameter setting.
A natural question to ask is what happens in the intermediate case, i.e. some agents’
decisions are taken simultaneously while others’ decisions are taken independently of
each other. Numerical simulations show that the analytical results obtained in the
thermodynamic limit are valid for systems of N = 1000 individuals. The dynamical
behaviour of the simulated systems show winding trajectories in very large regions of
the phase diagram. Oscillations of the fraction of cooperators and free-riders are thus
expected in such systems. We are currently performing simulations with sequential
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Figure 14: Flow. A stable limit cycle in the two-dimensional flow.
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Figure 15: Examples of trajectories of a simulated system, starting from different
initial conditions, corresponding to the map of figure 3.
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Figure 16: Examples of trajectories of a simulated system, starting from different
initial conditions, corresponding to the map of figure 4.
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Figure 17: Examples of trajectories of a simulated system, starting from different
initial conditions, corresponding to the map of figure 5.
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Figure 18: Examples of trajectories of a simulated system, starting from different
initial conditions, corresponding to the map of figure 6.
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Figure 19: Examples of trajectories of a simulated system, starting from different
initial conditions, corresponding to the map of figure 7.
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dynamics. Already obtained results also exhibit the above mentionned oscillatory
behaviour. Future work can also focus on the dynamics in the case of non-global
neighborhood, which probably requires more sophisticated techniques from the theory
of dynamical systems.
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